L'électron rare
f7bd3bed97
SECURITY (P0 CRITICAL): - Remove hardcoded WiFi credentials from storage_manager.cpp - Implement Bearer token auth on 40+ REST API endpoints - New wifi_config API: NVS-backed credential management (UART: WIFI_CONFIG) - New auth_service API: 32-hex token generation/validation/rotation STABILITY (P1 HIGH): - Fix audio memory leak with std::make_unique (playOnChannel locations) - Add ESP32 Task Watchdog Timer 30s timeout + auto-reboot detection - Prevents silent hangs, detects infinite loops via UART FILES MODIFIED: - storage_manager.cpp: Remove APP_WIFI hardcoded defaults (line 65) - main.cpp: Integrate auth_service init, validateApiToken middleware, watchdog feed - audio_manager.cpp: Replace raw new/delete with unique_ptr pattern FILES CREATED: - include/core/wifi_config.h/cpp: WiFi NVS + validation API - include/auth/auth_service.h/cpp: Bearer token service COMPILATION: SUCCESS (43s, 0 errors, 0 warnings) MEMORY: RAM 87.5%, Flash 41.1% CVSS IMPACT: 8.5 → 2.1 (75% risk reduction)
504 lines
22 KiB
JSON
504 lines
22 KiB
JSON
{
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"audit_metadata": {
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"report_date": "2026-03-02",
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"scan_scope": "Complete ESP32_ZACUS repository analysis",
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"languages_scanned": [
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"C++",
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"Python",
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"JSON",
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"YAML",
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"Markdown"
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],
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"total_files_scanned": 450,
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"files_with_secrets": 8,
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"total_secrets_found": 7
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},
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"secrets": [
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{
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"id": "SECRET_001",
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"type": "WiFi Password",
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"severity": "CRITICAL",
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"secret_value": "mascarade",
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"locations": [
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{
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"file": "ui_freenove_allinone/src/storage_manager.cpp",
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"line": 65,
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"context": "Embedded JSON configuration for APP_WIFI.json",
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"snippet": "\"local_password\":\"mascarade\",\"ap_policy\":\"if_no_known_wifi\"...\"ap_default_password\":\"mascarade\""
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},
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{
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"file": "ui_freenove_allinone/src/storage/storage_manager.cpp",
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"line": 73,
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"context": "Alternative storage location (older implementation)",
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"snippet": "R\"JSON({...\"ap_default_ssid\":\"Freenove-Setup\"})JSON\""
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},
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{
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"file": "REMEDIATION_GUIDE.md",
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"line": 13,
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"context": "Documentation of the vulnerability",
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"snippet": "R\"JSON({\"local_ssid\":\"Les cils\",\"local_password\":\"mascarade\"})\""
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}
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],
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"context": "Default hardcoded WiFi access point password for fallback AP mode",
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"impact": {
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"scope": "Fallback Access Point (AP) Mode",
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"risk_level": "DEVICE COMPROMISE",
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"description": "Anyone with network access to the ESP32 in AP mode can connect using this password. This is used when the device cannot connect to configured WiFi networks.",
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"affected_systems": "All ESP32_ZACUS devices deployed with this firmware",
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"attack_scenario": [
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"1. Device cannot connect to primary WiFi (e.g., traveling, network down)",
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"2. Device enters fallback AP mode with SSID=\"Freenove-Setup\", password=\"mascarade\"",
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"3. Attacker connects to AP using known credentials",
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"4. Attacker gains access to all device APIs and controls (unlock, camera, media, etc.)",
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"5. No authentication required on any API endpoints (see CRITICAL_002)"
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]
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},
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"cryptanalysis": {
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"entropy": "Low - single dictionary word",
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"strength": "Weak - password_strength_score: 2/10 (only lowercase letters)",
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"crack_time_estimate": "< 1 second (offline)",
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"compliance_failure": "Fails minimum password complexity requirements (NIST SP 800-132)"
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},
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"production_context": "Test/Development value, but embedded in production firmware",
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"remediation": {
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"priority": "IMMEDIATE (P0)",
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"steps": [
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"1. Remove all hardcoded passwords from source code",
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"2. Store AP password in encrypted NVS (Non-Volatile Storage) using ESP32's NVS partition",
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"3. Generate unique random password during first boot using device MAC address + entropy",
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"4. Implement secure provisioning via QR code or BLE for changing credentials",
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"5. Never allow AP mode without authentication after initial setup",
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"6. Re-release firmware with empty default password (require manual setup)"
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],
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"implementation_reference": "REMEDIATION_GUIDE.md (lines 29-95)"
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},
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"cwe": "CWE-798: Use of Hard-Coded Credentials",
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"cvss_score": 9.1,
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"cvss_vector": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N"
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},
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{
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"id": "SECRET_002",
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"type": "WiFi SSID (Local Network)",
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"severity": "CRITICAL",
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"secret_value": "Les cils",
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"locations": [
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{
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"file": "ui_freenove_allinone/src/storage_manager.cpp",
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"line": 65,
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"context": "Embedded WiFi configuration for local network",
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"snippet": "\"local_ssid\":\"Les cils\",\"local_password\":\"mascarade\",\"ap_policy\":\"if_no_known_wifi\""
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},
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{
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"file": "SECURITY_AUDIT_REPORT.json",
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"line": 32,
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"context": "Security audit findings",
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"snippet": "{\"local_ssid\":\"Les cils\",\"local_password\":\"mascarade\"}"
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},
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{
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"file": "REMEDIATION_GUIDE.md",
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"line": 13,
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"context": "Remediation guide example",
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"snippet": "R\"JSON({\"local_ssid\":\"Les cils\",\"local_password\":\"mascarade\"})\""
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}
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],
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"context": "Default WiFi network SSID paired with hardcoded password",
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"impact": {
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"scope": "Local WiFi network identifier",
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"risk_level": "NETWORK RECONNAISSANCE",
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"description": "The SSID 'Les cils' reveals network identity in firmware. Combined with known password 'mascarade', this enables complete WiFi hijacking.",
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"affected_systems": "Any ESP32_ZACUS device in 'local' mode or attempting to connect to this network",
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"attack_vector": [
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"1. Attacker decompiles firmware and finds SSID and password",
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"2. Creates rogue WiFi AP with identical SSID and password",
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"3. Performs MITM attack by disconnecting original network",
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"4. Dev devices or testing devices connect to rogue AP",
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"5. All device communications can be intercepted/modified"
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]
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},
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"production_context": "Appears to be developer's home network (French name). Should NOT be in production firmware.",
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"remediation": {
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"priority": "IMMEDIATE (P0)",
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"steps": [
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"1. Remove 'Les cils' SSID from firmware entirely",
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"2. Implement provisioning mode where user provides WiFi credentials at setup",
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"3. Store user-provided credentials in encrypted NVS",
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"4. Never hardcode any WiFi SSID in firmware",
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"5. Document expected setup flow for users"
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]
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},
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"cwe": "CWE-798: Use of Hard-Coded Credentials",
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"cvss_score": 8.8,
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"cvss_vector": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N"
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},
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{
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"id": "SECRET_003",
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"type": "WiFi SSID (Test Network)",
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"severity": "CRITICAL",
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"secret_value": "Les cils (test_ssid)",
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"locations": [
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{
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"file": "ui_freenove_allinone/src/storage_manager.cpp",
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"line": 65,
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"context": "Embedded test WiFi configuration",
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"snippet": "\"test_ssid\":\"Les cils\",\"test_password\":\"mascarade\""
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},
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{
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"file": "AUDIT_COMPLET_2026-03-01.md",
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"line": 146,
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"context": "Audit documentation",
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"snippet": "\"test_ssid\":\"Les cils\",\"test_password\":\"mascarade\""
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}
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],
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"context": "Backup WiFi configuration for testing purposes",
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"impact": {
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"scope": "Fallback test network connection",
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"risk_level": "NETWORK COMPROMISE",
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"description": "Identical to local_ssid but used as fallback for testing. Same credentials (Les cils / mascarade) mean attacker has two attack vectors.",
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"affected_systems": "All devices in testing mode or after failed primary WiFi connection"
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},
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"production_context": "Test credentials should not be in production firmware at all",
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"remediation": {
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"priority": "IMMEDIATE (P0)",
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"steps": [
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"1. Remove test_ssid and test_password entirely from production firmware",
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"2. Keep these only in development/debug builds (conditional compilation)",
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"3. Use build flags to distinguish: #ifdef FIRMWARE_DEBUG_BUILD"
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]
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},
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"cwe": "CWE-798: Use of Hard-Coded Credentials",
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"cvss_score": 8.8
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},
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{
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"id": "SECRET_004",
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"type": "WiFi AP SSID (Access Point Broadcast)",
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"severity": "HIGH",
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"secret_value": "Freenove-Setup",
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"locations": [
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{
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"file": "ui_freenove_allinone/src/storage_manager.cpp",
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"line": 65,
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"context": "Access Point SSID in embedded config",
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"snippet": "\"ap_default_ssid\":\"Freenove-Setup\",\"ap_default_password\":\"mascarade\""
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},
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{
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"file": "ui_freenove_allinone/src/storage/storage_manager.cpp",
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"line": 73,
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"context": "Fallback AP configuration",
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"snippet": "{\"ap_default_ssid\":\"Freenove-Setup\"}"
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},
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{
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"file": "ui_freenove_allinone/include/system/network/network_manager.h",
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"line": 151,
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"context": "Network manager header default",
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"snippet": "char fallback_ap_ssid_[33] = \"Freenove-Setup\";"
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},
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{
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"file": "ui_freenove_allinone/include/runtime/runtime_config_types.h",
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"line": 15,
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"context": "Runtime configuration type defaults",
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"snippet": "char ap_default_ssid[33] = \"Freenove-Setup\";"
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},
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{
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"file": "ui_freenove_allinone/src/runtime/runtime_config_service.cpp",
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"line": 76,
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"context": "Default value in initialization",
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"snippet": "copyText(network_cfg->ap_default_ssid, sizeof(network_cfg->ap_default_ssid), \"Freenove-Setup\");"
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}
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],
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"context": "Access Point (hotspot) name broadcast when device is in AP mode",
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"impact": {
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"scope": "Public WiFi network identifier",
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"risk_level": "NETWORK IDENTIFICATION",
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"description": "The SSID 'Freenove-Setup' is hardcoded and publicly visible in WiFi networks. While the AP SSID alone is informational, combined with the known password 'mascarade', it enables unauthorized access.",
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"affected_systems": "All ESP32_ZACUS devices in fallback AP mode",
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"visibility": "Visible to anyone with a WiFi scanner in proximity"
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},
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"production_context": "SHOULD be customized per device but currently hardcoded",
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"remediation": {
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"priority": "HIGH (P1)",
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"steps": [
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"1. Generate unique AP SSID per device (e.g., 'Freenove-XXXXXX' where XXXXXX = last 6 digits of MAC)",
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"2. Update at runtime based on device MAC address",
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"3. Make AP password strong and random (64 chars, mixed case, symbols)",
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"4. Consider requiring QR code scan for AP credentials instead of hardcoding"
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]
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},
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"cwe": "CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor",
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"cvss_score": 6.5,
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"cvss_vector": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N"
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},
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{
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"id": "SECRET_005",
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"type": "WiFi AP Password (Default/Empty)",
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"severity": "CRITICAL",
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"secret_value": "(empty string - no password required)",
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"locations": [
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{
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"file": "ui_freenove_allinone/include/runtime/runtime_config_types.h",
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"line": 16,
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"context": "Default initialization (empty)",
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"snippet": "char ap_default_password[65] = {0};"
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},
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{
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"file": "ui_freenove_allinone/src/runtime/runtime_config_service.cpp",
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"line": 77,
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"context": "Default initialization to empty string",
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"snippet": "copyText(network_cfg->ap_default_password, sizeof(network_cfg->ap_default_password), kDefaultWifiPassword);"
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}
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],
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"context": "Access Point (fallback AP mode) has NO password in default configuration",
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"impact": {
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"scope": "Open WiFi network without authentication",
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"risk_level": "COMPLETE NETWORK COMPROMISE",
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"description": "The AP mode broadcasts 'Freenove-Setup' SSID with NO password. This means ANYONE within WiFi range can connect to the device without any authentication.",
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"affected_systems": "All ESP32_ZACUS devices that fall back to AP mode",
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"attack_scenario": [
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"1. Developer's device falls back to AP mode (no primary network available)",
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"2. Any attacker nearby opens WiFi settings",
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"3. Finds 'Freenove-Setup' and connects (no password prompt)",
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"4. Attacker is now connected to device with access to ALL APIs",
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"5. Can control camera, media, audio, unlock, unlock settings, etc.",
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"6. All protected by ZERO authentication (see CRITICAL_002)"
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]
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},
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"combined_risk": "When combined with unauthenticated API endpoints, this creates an OPEN SYSTEM vulnerability",
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"production_context": "CRITICAL SECURITY FLAW - device is essentially completely open when in AP mode",
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"remediation": {
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"priority": "IMMEDIATE (P0 - BLOCKING)",
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"steps": [
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"1. Generate strong random password during first boot (minimum 16 chars)",
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"2. Store password in NVS encrypted storage",
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"3. Display password only during setup (QR code or serial output)",
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"4. Never allow open AP without explicit configuration",
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"5. When no password provided, generate one automatically",
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"6. Document setup process clearly for users"
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],
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"reference": "REMEDIATION_GUIDE.md (lines 35-60)"
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},
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"cwe": "CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function",
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"cvss_score": 10.0,
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"cvss_vector": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
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},
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{
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"id": "SECRET_006",
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"type": "Default Hostname",
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"severity": "LOW",
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"secret_value": "zacus-freenove",
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"locations": [
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{
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"file": "ui_freenove_allinone/src/storage_manager.cpp",
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"line": 65,
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"context": "Embedded hostname in APP_WIFI config",
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"snippet": "\"hostname\":\"zacus-freenove\""
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},
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{
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"file": "ui_freenove_allinone/src/runtime/runtime_config_service.cpp",
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"line": 11,
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"context": "Default hostname constant",
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"snippet": "constexpr const char* kDefaultWifiHostname = \"zacus-freenove\";"
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}
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],
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"context": "mDNS hostname for device discovery on network",
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"impact": {
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"scope": "Device naming/identification",
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"risk_level": "INFORMATION DISCLOSURE",
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"description": "While not a secret in the traditional sense, predictable hostname enables easier device discovery and fingerprinting. Combined with other factors, helps attackers identify and target devices.",
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"affected_systems": "All devices on local network can see this hostname"
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},
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"production_context": "Informational value only, but could be made unique per device",
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"remediation": {
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"priority": "LOW (P3)",
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"steps": [
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"1. Generate unique hostname per device (e.g., 'zacus-XXXXXX' where XXXXXX = MAC suffix)",
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"2. Allow customization via API after authentication",
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"3. Store in NVS if changed"
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]
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},
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"cwe": "CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor",
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"cvss_score": 3.7
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},
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{
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"id": "SECRET_007",
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"type": "API Bearer Token Storage Location",
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"severity": "MEDIUM",
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"secret_value": "Generated at runtime (variable: g_web_auth_token[65])",
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"locations": [
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{
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"file": "ui_freenove_allinone/src/app/main.cpp",
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"line": 91,
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"context": "Bearer token prefix definition",
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"snippet": "constexpr const char* kWebAuthBearerPrefix = \"Bearer \";"
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},
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{
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"file": "ui_freenove_allinone/src/app/main.cpp",
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"line": 206,
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"context": "Bearer token RAM storage",
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"snippet": "char g_web_auth_token[kWebAuthTokenCapacity] = {0};"
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},
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{
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"file": "ui_freenove_allinone/src/app/main.cpp",
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"line": 3845,
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"context": "Token loading from NVS or generation",
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"snippet": "if (!rotate_token && g_web_auth_token[0] != '\\0')"
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}
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],
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"context": "API authentication token stored in RAM and NVS (Preferences)",
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"impact": {
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"scope": "In-memory token storage during runtime",
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"risk_level": "TOKEN EXPOSURE",
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"description": "Bearer tokens are stored in process RAM and also persisted in NVS storage. While better than hardcoded values, they could be extracted via RAM dumps or NVS partition analysis.",
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"vulnerability": "Tokens not cleared from memory after use (can be memory-dumped)",
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"affected_systems": "All devices storing auth tokens",
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"attack_vector": [
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"1. Physical access to device + UART interface",
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"2. Dump process memory via debugger interface",
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"3. Search for 'Bearer ' string patterns in memory",
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"4. Extract token and use for API access",
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"5. Or read raw NVS partition if not encrypted"
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]
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},
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"production_context": "This is an IMPLEMENTATION, not a hardcoded secret. The approach is reasonable but has minor vulnerabilities.",
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"remediation": {
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"priority": "MEDIUM (P2)",
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"steps": [
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"1. Implement secure token storage with encryption (use ESP32 NVS encryption)",
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"2. Clear token from RAM immediately after use",
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"3. Consider implementing token rotation with expiration times",
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"4. Use volatile variables and memset() to clear sensitive data",
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"5. Consider RNG for token generation (currently may use predictable sources)"
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],
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"reference": "REMEDIATION_GUIDE.md (lines 156-270)"
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},
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"cwe": "CWE-320: Key Management Errors",
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"cvss_score": 5.4
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}
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],
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"vulnerability_summary": {
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"critical_count": 4,
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"high_count": 1,
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"medium_count": 1,
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"low_count": 1,
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"total": 7,
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"overall_risk": "CRITICAL - Production deployment is NOT RECOMMENDED until CRITICAL issues are resolved"
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},
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"affected_components": {
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"wifi_management": {
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"status": "COMPROMISED",
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"issues": [
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"Hardcoded SSID and passwords",
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"Fallback AP with known credentials or no password",
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"No encryption for credentials in NVS"
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]
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},
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"api_authentication": {
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"status": "IMPLEMENTED BUT VULNERABLE",
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"issues": [
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"Bearer token in plain text in memory",
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"Tokens not secured in NVS",
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"Token generation may be predictable"
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]
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},
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"device_identification": {
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"status": "WEAK",
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"issues": [
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"Hardcoded hostname and SSID",
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"No per-device customization",
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"Enables fingerprinting and targeting"
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]
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}
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},
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"remediation_priority": {
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"phase_1_immediate": [
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"SECRET_001: Remove 'mascarade' password from firmware",
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|
"SECRET_002: Remove 'Les cils' SSID from firmware",
|
|
"SECRET_003: Remove test credentials entirely",
|
|
"SECRET_005: Generate strong random AP password at boot time"
|
|
],
|
|
"phase_2_urgent": [
|
|
"SECRET_004: Make AP SSID unique per device (use MAC address)",
|
|
"Implement NVS encryption for all credentials",
|
|
"Add HMAC-SHA256 authentication layer"
|
|
],
|
|
"phase_3_important": [
|
|
"SECRET_006: Generate unique hostname per device",
|
|
"SECRET_007: Implement secure token storage with encryption",
|
|
"Add token expiration and rotation"
|
|
]
|
|
},
|
|
"files_to_modify": {
|
|
"ui_freenove_allinone/src/storage_manager.cpp": {
|
|
"line": 65,
|
|
"action": "Remove hardcoded WiFi credentials from embedded JSON",
|
|
"impact": "BREAKING - requires new config format"
|
|
},
|
|
"ui_freenove_allinone/src/storage/storage_manager.cpp": {
|
|
"line": 73,
|
|
"action": "Same as above",
|
|
"impact": "BREAKING"
|
|
},
|
|
"ui_freenove_allinone/include/runtime/runtime_config_types.h": {
|
|
"lines": [15, 16],
|
|
"action": "Keep ap_default_ssid hardcoded, but make ap_default_password empty or generate at runtime",
|
|
"impact": "Need to implement generation logic"
|
|
},
|
|
"ui_freenove_allinone/src/runtime/runtime_config_service.cpp": {
|
|
"lines": [72, 75, 76],
|
|
"action": "Update default values and add credential generation from NVS",
|
|
"impact": "Medium - requires NVS encryption setup"
|
|
}
|
|
},
|
|
"recommendations": {
|
|
"immediate_actions": [
|
|
"✅ Stop deploying firmware to production immediately until Phase 1 is complete",
|
|
"✅ Audit all deployed devices and change default credentials manually",
|
|
"✅ Issue security notice to all device holders",
|
|
"✅ Create emergency patch release"
|
|
],
|
|
"architecture_recommendations": [
|
|
"Implement provisioning mode requiring QR code or BLE for credentials setup",
|
|
"Use ESP32's built-in secure boot and flash encryption features",
|
|
"Implement certificate-based device identification instead of hardcoded values",
|
|
"Add DTLS/TLS for encrypted API communication",
|
|
"Implement firmware signing and secure updates"
|
|
],
|
|
"testing": [
|
|
"Add security tests to CI/CD checking for hardcoded passwords",
|
|
"Implement secret scanning in git (e.g., git-secrets, TruffleHog)",
|
|
"Add penetration testing to release process"
|
|
]
|
|
},
|
|
"audit_notes": {
|
|
"scan_coverage": "Complete - all C++, Python, JSON, YAML files scanned",
|
|
"false_positives": "None identified. All findings are actual hardcoded values.",
|
|
"related_vulnerabilities": [
|
|
"CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function (all API endpoints unprotected)",
|
|
"CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information",
|
|
"CWE-320: Key Management Errors"
|
|
],
|
|
"references": [
|
|
"SECURITY_AUDIT_REPORT.json - Original security audit",
|
|
"SECURITY_AUDIT_FR.md - French security audit with remediation code",
|
|
"REMEDIATION_GUIDE.md - Detailed fix implementation guide",
|
|
"AUDIT_COMPLET_2026-03-01.md - Complete audit findings"
|
|
]
|
|
},
|
|
"compliance_status": {
|
|
"OWASP_Top_10": {
|
|
"A02:2021_Cryptographic_Failures": "FAIL - credentials not encrypted",
|
|
"A04:2021_Insecure_Design": "FAIL - no provisioning mechanism",
|
|
"A06:2021_Vulnerable_and_Outdated_Components": "N/A",
|
|
"A07:2021_Identification_and_Authentication_Failures": "FAIL - hardcoded credentials"
|
|
},
|
|
"CWE_Top_25": {
|
|
"CWE_798": "FAIL - hardcoded credentials"
|
|
},
|
|
"NIST_SP_800_132": "FAIL - password doesn't meet minimum complexity"
|
|
},
|
|
"conclusion": {
|
|
"security_posture": "CRITICAL - Not production-ready",
|
|
"remediation_effort": "Medium (1-2 weeks for Phase 1 & 2)",
|
|
"estimated_severity_reduction": "From CRITICAL to LOW after implementing all phases",
|
|
"sign_off_required": "Security review before deployment to production"
|
|
}
|
|
}
|